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PANEL I:  The End of Equivalents? 
Examining the Fallout from 
Festo 
Moderator: John Richards* 
Panelists: J. Michael Jakes† 
 Herbert Schwartz‡ 
 Harold C. Wegner§ 
 
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Thank you, Dean Treanor. 
What we are going to do first is have opening statements from 
each of our panelists here.  They are going to talk for ten minutes 
or so on their views of the Festo situation, and then we are going to 
open up into a general discussion, and those in the audience who 
feel they want to contribute are heartily encouraged to do so. 
Our first speaker will be Professor Wegner.  Professor Wegner 
is a Partner at Foley & Lardner in Washington, D.C.  For many 
years he ran the IP program at George Washington University in 
Washington, D.C.  He is sometimes credited with opening up the 
knowledge of Japanese patent law in English-speaking countries 
by the work he did when he was a visiting professor in Tokyo 
several years ago.  He has spoken widely and written widely on IP 
subjects, particularly in the patent field.  He is a regular contributor 
to the Annual International Intellectual Property Law and Policy 
Conference that you have here at Fordham in the spring. 
 
*  Partner, Ladas & Parry, New York, New York.  Adjunct Associate Professor, 
Fordham University School of Law.  B.A., Cambridge University, 1966; M.A., 
Cambridge University, 1970; LL.B., University of London, 1979. 
†  Partner, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, Washington, D.C.  B.S., 
summa cum laude, Duke University, 1979; M.S., Johns Hopkins University, 1983; J.D., 
magna cum laude, Georgetown University Law Center, 1986. 
‡  Senior Partner, Fish & Neave, New York, New York.  B.S., Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, 1957; M.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1964; LL.B., cum laude, 
University of Pennsylvania, 1964. 
§  Partner, Foley & Lardner, Washington, D.C.  B.A., Northwestern University, 1965; 
J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1969. 
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With that introduction, Hal, if you would like to start off, 
please. 
MR. WEGNER: Thank you very much. 
I will make this introductory portion very brief to provide 
everyone with a little grounding on where we stand with Festo.  
Then, we’ll turn the program over to these two distinguished 
panelists—trial litigators who have all sorts of insights of their 
own.  Later, after you all have had a chance to talk, I would like to 
offer some comparative insights. 
Just when we thought the Festo nightmare was over, on 
September 20, the Federal Circuit acted1I don’t know what 
water they are drinking inside the Beltway.  You know, 
Washington, D.C. combines the best of the North and the South, 
northern charm and southern efficiency. 
[laughter] 
They have done it again.  After all the scholarly criticisms that 
Rooklidge2 and Tramposch3 and others have had of the Federal 
Circuit for their judicial legislation, their en banc advice, look 
what’s happened.  (You know, you learned in law school, some of 
us many years ago, some of you now, that in the common law 
system you should take matters case by case and you don’t have 
advisory opinions). 
The Federal Circuit goes out of its way, it seems, to give en 
banc dictum.  They can’t wait to fill in the blank spaces.  It has 
taken hundreds of years for the common law to develop, and they 
just can’t wait to fill in every little blank space.  After the Festo 
Supreme Court remand, they had some open spaces, so they were 
going to fill in the blanks. 
 
1  Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 304 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (en banc), vacated by 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
2 See William C. Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil, Judicial Hyperactivity: The Federal 
Circuit’s Discomfort with Its Appellate Role, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725 (2000) 
(suggesting that the Federal Circuit should take care to avoid forms of decision-making 
best left to the trial courts). 
3 See Albert Tramposch, The Dilemma of Conflicting Precedent: Three Options in the 
Federal Circuit, 17 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N Q.J. 323 (1989) (discussing ways in 
which conflicting precedent may be resolved in the Federal Circuit without resorting to 
en banc consideration). 
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On May 28 the Supreme Court remanded the case to the 
Federal Circuit, saying: you are wrong about a flexible bar on 
equivalents and you are right about any narrowing amendment 
creating an estoppel, but now here are some loose ends.4 
So on September 20, at least seven of the twelve members of 
the court were drinking this funny water, because they could have 
issued a simple panel opinion and remanded the case back to the 
district court, telling the court to take a look at the issues the 
Supreme Court has raised and answer their questions.  Then, the 
issues could have percolated back up to the Federal Circuit.  But, 
no!  En banc—it takes seven of the twelve regular judges to create 
an en banc order—they told the parties to now brief four issues, 
and the bar, the public, to brief two general issues: whether juries 
or judges should decide some of the issues in Festo and what tests 
should be used.5 
Already, the Bar Association of the District of Columbia has 
filed an amicus curiae brief.6  The period is still open, I think until 
November 19, for other bar associations to file briefs.  Maybe 
some of my co-panelists will shed some light on which groups are 
still actively considering such action.  I see the smile on Mr. Jakes’ 
face; maybe he is involved in one of them.7 
My message to the court, if anyone is listening, is you can still 
undo your mistake.  Nobody put their name on the en banc order.  
The grant of an en banc order is anonymous.  It takes seven of the 
twelve regular judges to create an en banc order.  So please, seven 
of you, would you please take this back?  Please rescind this en 
banc order. 
 
4 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732–42 
(2002). 
5 See Festo, 304 F.3d at 1290–91. 
6 Brief for Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party on Behalf of the Patent, 
Trademark, & Copyright Section of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia, 
Festo, 535 U.S. at 722 (No. 00-1543), http://www.ipcreators.org/pdf-files/Merits%20 
briefs/dcbar.DOC. 
7 See Brief For Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association, Festo 
v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir.) (No. 95-1066), 
vacated by 535 U.S. 722 (2002), http://www.aipla.org/html/festo99.html. 
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Just imagine what happens if the court now issues another en 
banc opinion.  There is this en banc order for briefing, another en 
banc hearing.  What’s the difference?  If you have an en banc 
decision called Festo, maybe the Supreme Court will take 
particular notice.  Maybe if the Federal Circuit issued a decision in 
a case called “Jones v. Smith” or “Bob v. Mary” or something like 
that, maybe it would not get so much attention.  But Festo!  It 
would seem like almost a challenge to the Supreme Court to 
review the case one more time. 
So where do we stand, briefly, on Festo?  If you aren’t familiar 
with Festo, the conference organizers in this wonderful book of 
symposium materials, in the first fifty or sixty pages, provide the 
several opinions of the court.8  And then I have an outline called 
“Festering Questions After Festo,” so you don’t need to take 
notes.9  I will just go through this as an outline before turning the 
microphone over to the co-panelists. 
The first section is an overview that discusses the new 
September 20 en banc order.10  The hearing is on February 6, 2003.  
And then who knows when a decision will come2003 or 2004. 
In the final two minutes before I turn the panel over to my 
colleagues, I would like to discuss the issue of equity.  Ten years 
ago or so, in Hilton Davis, the Federal Circuit en banc, in a split 
opinion, said that equivalents is an issue for the jury, not an equity 
issue.11  I think that the doctrine of equivalents should be an equity 
issue.  I am saying that as a pragmatic answer, because if it is an 
equity issue, then it is a matter for the judge. 
I would like to see the doctrine of equivalents handled by a 
judge and applied in rare situations, only where there is a very 
compelling case.  I am not totally alone.  Judge Plager, Judge Linn, 
 
8 Opinions appearing in the symposium materials included Festo, 535 U.S. at 722; 
Festo, 234 F.3d at 558; and Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 
17 (1997). 
9 Harold C. Wegner, Festering Questions after Festo, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 891 (2003). 
10 See id. 
11 See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1522 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (en banc) (per curiam), rev’d, 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
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and some others agree with this position,12 but the majority from a 
decade ago did not.13 
So in my discussion at pages seven through eleven, I say 
reopen the equity door.  My plea against en banc dictum is called 
“Clouding the Future with an En Banc Dictum,” at pages eleven 
through fourteen. 
To me, as a student of the law, I think the Court of Appeals, as 
opposed to the Supreme Court, should be judging cases on a case-
by-case basis when facts require it, and not to be prospectively, 
from the eighth and ninth floors of Madison Place, giving 
pronouncements as to what the law should be for all situations.  
The law should develop, in my opinion, in the way it has done for 
centuries in the common law system, on a case-by-case basis, 
where there is a holding necessary for the case. 
With that as a background, I’d like to turn the panel over to 
John. 
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Okay. 
The next person to give their brief introduction is Herb 
Schwartz, who is a Senior Partner at Fish & Neave, a strong 
supporter of the law school here and a regular speaker at our spring 
conferences.  He is a Fellow of the American College of Trial 
Lawyers and the American Bar Foundation.  He has written a 
textbook, Principles of Patent Law.14  He is in Who’s Who in IP,15 
Best Lawyers in America,16 The One Hundred Most Influential 
Lawyers in America,17 and he is extremely well regarded 
throughout the patent profession. 
MR. SCHWARTZ: Thank you, John. 
As a practitioner rather than as an academic—although I 
dabble in academia at times—I will talk a little bit more about 
 
12 See id. at 1536–45 (Plager, J., dissenting). 
13 See id. at 1521–22. 
14 DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW (2000). 
15 Who’s Who in IP, LEGAL TIMES, May 7, 2001, at 28. 
16 GREGORY W. SMITH & STEVEN W. NAIFEH, THE BEST LAWYERS IN AMERICA 2003–
2004 (10th ed. 2002). 
17 Margaret Cronin Fisk, The 100 Most Influential Lawyers in America, NAT’L L.J., 
June 12, 2000, at A1. 
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some of the practical aspects of what has happened in Festo since 
it has come down, because that is something I have to deal with a 
little more.  In terms of whether it is a good idea or a bad idea for 
the Federal Circuit to do what it has been doing, I think that is 
something I am not going to change in my lifetime, and therefore I 
am really not going to spend much time worrying about it at this 
point. 
What is interesting to me is to see what has happened since 
Festo in terms of what they have asked to be considered en banc 
and what some district courts have done,18 because the real issue 
ultimately is how this plays out in the district courts in the first 
instance, and then ultimately what happens on appeal. 
Basically, it has been hornbook law for a long time that 
limitations on the doctrine of equivalents are a question of law,19 
whatever that means, or basically limitations on the doctrine of 
equivalents based on things happening in the file wrapper are 
questions of law.20  I think people have assumed that file wrapper 
estoppel is a question of law. 
But what has happened since the Supreme Court in Festo is 
that the Federal Circuit and some district courts are focusing on 
whether or not there are factual issues which underlie an ultimate 
determination of a question of file wrapper estoppel.21  You are 
getting into something that almost sounds like you may have Festo 
hearings as well as Markman hearings22 someday, and you may 
have Festo hearings which could even be factual. 
 
18 See, e.g., Glaxo Wellcome Inc. v. Impax Labs., Inc., 220 F. Supp. 2d 1089 (N.D. Cal. 
2002) (holding that prosecution history estoppel barred infringement by the doctrine of 
equivalents, since the equivalents in question were known substitutes and the patent 
owner did not include them in the amendments to the claims); Glaxo Wellcome Inc. v. 
Eon Labs Mfg., Inc., No. 00-CV-9089, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14950 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 
2002). 
19 See ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 345 (5th ed. 2001). 
20 See id. at 362 (explaining the equitable nature of file wrapper estoppel). 
21 See Impax Labs., 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1093; Eon Labs, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14923, 
at *8. 
22 A Markman hearing is a court’s review of the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to 
construe the asserted patent claims as a matter of law. See Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (holding that claim construction is a matter for a 
judge and not a jury). 
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To me, the most interesting situation that brings this up is 
illustrated by two very recent cases involving Glaxo Wellcome.  
Glaxo Wellcome was a plaintiff in two lawsuits against two 
different defendants in two different courts.23  Here in the Southern 
District of New York, in Glaxo Wellcome v. Eon Labs 
Manufacturing, Inc.,24 the court considered the question of what 
happens in the Festo situation;25 the court decided that there was a 
triable issue of fact with respect to the foreseeability of a particular 
chemical as a sustained release agent, and denied summary 
judgment on the ground of file wrapper estoppel.26 
In a suit on the very same patent two weeks later, in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California, a 
different federal judge with exactly the same facts before her, and 
having full well in mind what the Southern District of New York 
did, decided precisely to the contrary.27  She held that there was 
nothing to try, that she could decide as a matter of law that there 
was file wrapper estoppel, and she essentially dismissed the 
complaint.28 
So we now have the situation where what one district court 
decidesthat, as a practical matter, not only is there something to 
look at from a factual point of view, but you are even entitled to a 
trial on it, maybe even possibly a jury trial.29  For me, that is a 
startling consequence.  That is something that seems to be just a 
simple engraftment on the doctrine of equivalents. 
To me, if this is the beginning of the unraveling of all of this, it 
is just hard to know where it is going, other than possibly to make 
patent litigation even more expensive and complicated than it is 
now.  I guess for a practitioner maybe that is a good thing; but for 
the system, I do not think it is a good thing that it is making the 
system even more expensive and complicated.  And if we layer this 
sort of problem onto it, it will get even worse.  Obviously, the 
 
23 See Impax Labs., 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1089; Eon Labs, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14950. 
24 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14950. 
25 See id. 
26 See id. at *14. 
27 See Impax Labs., 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1093. 
28 See id. at 1093–97. 
29 See Eon Labs, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14923. 
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Federal Circuit has this in mind when they want to consider 
whether foreseeability, tangentialness, and reasonable expectations 
are questions of law or fact.30  How they ultimately deal with that 
and what they say and whether they leave it a question of what you 
would call Markman-type mixed law and fact,31 which is for a 
court to decide, or whether they would call it simply a question of 
true fact, which you would leave for a jury to decide, really 
remains to be seen.32 
I will just finish very briefly.  There are some glimmers of the 
court’s meaning when you look in the Johnson decision,33 a recent 
well-known decision, where Judge Rader thought that 
foreseeability is a factual issue,34 and Judge Lourie said, if it is a 
factual issue, we are going to have jury trials on it.35  This was not 
in the Festo context, but in the context of Johnson, about what was 
foreseeable—what happens as to what is disclosed in a 
specification, and whether you have to claim it.36 
So you can already begin to see the sides forming in the 
Federal Circuit as to whether foreseeability is a question of fact or 
a question of law.  Where it will come out, no one knows, other 
than, as far as I can tell, to increase the complexity and expense. 
Thank you. 
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Thank you, Herb. 
Our third panelist this morning is Mike Jakes, who is a Partner 
in Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner in 
Washington, D.C.  He is also an adjunct professor, teaching patent 
law in Washington, D.C.  He has a book on patents before the 
Federal Circuit, which is well used by those of us in the profession.  
 
30 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 304 F.3d 1289 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) (en banc), vacated by 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
31 Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388–89 (1996). 
32 See id. (holding that judges are more capable of interpreting claims because of their 
special training, the technicality of the claims, and need for uniformity in the system). But 
see SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
(holding that in patent cases, damages are a question of fact and properly reviewed by a 
jury). 
33 Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
34 See id. at 1056–59 (Rader, J., concurring). 
35 See id. at 1063 (Lourie, J., concurring). 
36 Id. 
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He has handled many, many appellate cases before the Federal 
Circuit and he wrote the AIPLA (American Intellectual Property 
Law Association) amicus brief on Festo itself,37 so he is well 
suited to tell us about it. 
MR. JAKES: Thank you very much.  I am very pleased to be 
here this morning.  Thank you for inviting me. 
I did smile when Hal mentioned the amicus briefs that are 
currently being filed, because I had the opportunity to participate 
in the original briefing process as counsel for the amicus AIPLA.38  
Since then, unfortunately, clients have lined up on both sides of 
that issue, and because of positional conflicts, I have not been 
allowed to put anything in writing before the Federal Circuit, as I 
would like to.  So I would like to take today to at least express 
some of my views. 
MR. WEGNER: Hopefully, unfettered. 
MR. JAKES: People who practice frequently in front of the 
Federal Circuit are usually concerned with the day-to-day of how 
to win a case, and so if you will indulge me, I would like to be a 
little more philosophical today because it is something that we do 
not often get to do. 
I would like to start with why I think the Federal Circuit did 
what it did in Festo.  In my opinion, the doctrine of equivalents has 
been the single issue of the court’s jurisprudence that has defined it 
over its twenty-year existence.  From the Hughes Aircraft case,39 to 
Pennwalt40 in the 1980sand I was there for the Pennwalt 
episode, clerking for Giles Richto now the Warner-Jenkinson41 
and Festo cases,42 the Federal Circuit has devoted more time, more 
 
37 See Brief for Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association, Festo 
v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (No. 95-
1066), vacated by 535 U.S. 722 (2002), http://www.aipla.org/html/festo99.html. 
38 See id. 
39 Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
40 Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
41 Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1522 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (en banc) (per curiam), rev’d, 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
42 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 304 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (en banc); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 
(Fed. Cir. 2000), vacated by 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
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energy, and certainly more pages to the doctrine of equivalents 
than any other issue.  While I think the court’s effort has been very 
noble and they at times tried to do what they can to improve the 
doctrine, I believe it is still inherently uncertain and will always be 
that way. 
I would like to read a quote by Judge Learned Hand—who was 
probably one of our greatest patent judges—from a 1929 opinion 
that I have quoted many times, Claude Neon Lights.43  Speaking on 
the doctrine of equivalents, he said: “It is obviously impossible to 
set any theoretic limits to such a doctrine.”44  And as for the hope 
of certainty, he said: “Each case is inevitably a matter of degree . . . 
and other decisions have little or no value. . . .  Any decision is 
bound to have an arbitrary color . . . .”45  I think that is as true 
today as it was in 1929. 
Despite these warnings, the Federal Circuit has tried to set 
theoretical limits to the doctrine and I think Festo was just the 
latest example.  But instead of going to the root of the problem, 
which is the inherent uncertainty of the doctrine, I think Festo went 
to a branch, which was prosecution history estoppel, and sawed it 
off.46  And although the majority in Festo said that the flexible bar 
rule had become unworkable,47 in my view it is certainly no worse 
than letting a jury decide the function-way-result test or 
insubstantial differences. 
So the certainty, if any, that was gained by the Federal 
Circuit’s decision was in simply eliminating a certain number of 
cases for which the doctrine of equivalents could apply.48  I think 
the supporters of the Federal Circuit’s absolute bar rule would 
agree with that. 
There was an amicus brief filed by three very large companies, 
IBM, Ford, and Kodak, and they cited uncertainty as a policy 
 
43 Claude Neon Lights, Inc. v. E. Machlett & Son, 36 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1929). 
44 Id. at 576. 
45 Id. 
46 See Festo, 234 F.3d at 567. 
47 See id. at 595. 
48 See id. at 566–67, 577–78. 
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supporting an absolute bar.49  But I really think it was the 
uncertainty of the doctrine itself that motivated them, rather than a 
focus on prosecution history estoppel.  I think companies such as 
this benefit from not having a doctrine at all.  They have large 
patent portfolios, they have large scopes of literal infringement that 
they can assert, and most often the doctrine of equivalents is used 
as a weapon against them than the other way around. 
So what was wrong with the Federal Circuit’s approach? 
Well, first, it changed the rules for a million or more patents.  
In Warner-Jenkinson, Justice Ginsburg had given fair warning that 
this could be a problem.50  She specifically wrote about upsetting 
the rules of patent prosecution and the settled expectations of 
patent owners.51  And if we know one thing, the Supreme Court is 
usually a conservative body when it comes to property owners. 
Second, the Festo decision, and even as it continues, 
complicates patent prosecution.52  It makes the usual give and take 
between an applicant and examiner more difficult.53  In this 
respectand this is a particular notion of mineit puts too much 
focus on the attorney, which is something I really do not like in 
litigation.  I think the focus should be on the merits of the 
invention.  So you can have two patent applications with identical 
claims prosecuted in two different ways and could end up with 
different scope, and that puts the focus on the attorney rather than 
the merits. 
And finally, I do not think the Federal Circuit’s decision could 
be labeled anything other than judicial activism.  The doctrine of 
equivalents is purely a judicial doctrine, and what the court gives, 
 
49 See Brief of Amicus Curiae International Business Machines Corp. et al., Festo Corp. 
v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002) (No. 00-1543). 
50 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 41 (1997) (Ginsburg, 
J., concurring). 
51 See id. 
52 See Noreen Krall & Celeste B. Filoia, The Doctrine of Equivalents: An Analysis of 
the Festo Decision, 17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 373, 383 (2001) 
(concluding that the application of prosecution history estoppel as delineated by the 
Federal Circuit in Festo will increase the number of claims filed in a given application 
and alter the scope of claim coverage to avoid narrowing amendments that would trigger 
the Festo effect). 
53 See id. 
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it can certainly take away.  But it is nothing more than a balancing 
of economic interests, and no one elected Federal Circuit judges to 
make these important decisions of industrial policy.  So I think that 
the decision had problems from the start. 
What about the Supreme Court’s decision?  Did it do any 
better?  Here I have a couple of other quotes I would like to read. 
In one article, a member of the bar was quoted as saying that 
the rumors of the “demise of the doctrine of equivalents have been 
greatly exaggerated, much to the relief of the holders of the 
approximately 1.2 million patents still in force.”54 
Another member of the bar, quoted on approximately the same 
day or two after Festo, said that the Supreme Court has only 
“tweaked” the Federal Circuit’s decision, replacing the absolute 
bar with a presumption that “will be difficult to overcome.”55 
What is the correct position?  Well, as you might expect, I 
think there is certainly an element of truth in both.  I think patent 
owners relying on equivalents today are better off than they were 
right after Festo, but certainly no better off than they were before 
the original Festo decision. 
For the particular issue at hand, the Supreme Court, I believe, 
is following the path that it set out in Warner-Jenkinson, creating 
another rebuttable presumption, this time holding that the 
presumption of surrender could be rebutted if the equivalent was 
unforeseeable, tangential to the amendment, or not “reasonably be 
expected to have [been] described”56I particularly like that 
phrase. 
These exceptions will require case-to-case development.  I 
agree with Hal that that is the way it should be and that the Federal 
Circuit’s attempts to answer broad questions en banc have not 
usually been very successful. 
Now, there are a couple of inklings in other cases as to how 
these exceptions might go.  One that I will cite to you is 
 
54 Gary Young, High Court Buttresses Patent Rule, NAT’L L.J., June 3, 2002, at A11 
(quoting Albert Keyack, partner at the Philadelphia office of Schnader Harrison Segal & 
Lewis LLP). 
55 See id. (quoting Gregory Castanias of the Washington, D.C., office of Jones Day). 
56 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 740 (2002). 
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SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Excel Pharmaceuticals, Inc.57  This 
is an Eastern District of Virginia case decided after the Festo 
Supreme Court decision, where the court took a very narrow view 
of the unforeseeability exception, holding that the failure of a 
patentee to draft an intermediate claim that would have covered 
both the disclosed species of the inventions and the accused 
product flunked the Festo test, and so held that there was 
prosecution history estoppel.58 
But there is some hope with this tangential relationship test.  In 
another case, Vardon Golf v. Karsten Manufacturing Corp., out of 
the Northern District of Illinois, the court held that the presumption 
had been rebutted; the limitation for which equivalents was 
asserted was not the focal point of the narrowing amendment.59  So 
maybe there is some promise there. 
These cases are interesting, but the real question is what the 
Federal Circuit is going to do.  I don’t know how good a job the 
court will do in addressing these en banc questions.  But the truth 
is, I think it is just the beginning. 
As Herb Schwartz mentioned, there are other questions that we 
are going to be faced with, for example: What type of evidence is 
going to be allowed to rebut the presumption; will we be seeing 
extrinsic evidence, maybe expert testimony, on foreseeability?  Are 
we headed toward Festo hearings, similar to Markman hearings?60  
Are we going to hear from experts who are skilled in the art, or are 
we going to have to put patent attorneys on the stand to explain 
what a reasonable person drafting claims would have done in this 
circumstance?  I do not view that as a good development. 
But to return to where I started, for answering these questions, 
I don’t know that the application of the doctrine of equivalents will 
be any more certain.  In fact, I do not believe that it will, and I 
think that is the lesson the Federal Circuit has taught us over the 
 
57 214 F. Supp. 2d 581 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
58 See id. at 588–89, 592. 
59 Vardon Golf v. Karsten Mfg. Corp., No. 99-CV-2785, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11802, 
at *15 (N.D. Ill. June 27, 2002). 
60 See supra note 22. 
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last twenty years, that no matter how hard you try, there is inherent 
uncertainty in the doctrine.61 
So the fundamental question to ask ourselves, and one that we 
may discuss this morning, is: are we prepared to live with that 
uncertainty?  The Federal Circuit, at least in the Festo case, 
seemed to say that it was not.62  Should we be thinking about 
alternatives to the doctrine of equivalents?  Should we abolish the 
doctrine of equivalents as not being worth the effort? 
As you may or may not knowand Hal Wegner wrote an 
excellent paper on this subject about ten years agothe doctrine of 
equivalents has a long history, dating back to at least the 1800s, 
before patents even had formal claims, and it was a doctrine of 
equity.63  I agree with him on that view. 
But today, inventors are allowed to draft their claims more 
broadly than the specification discloses.  They are allowed to get 
whatever coverage they can, consistent with the statute and the 
prior art and the examination process, and maybe that should be 
enough. 
Well, occasionally mistakes are made.  Attorneys do make 
mistakes.  Inventors do not appreciate the full scope of their 
invention.  So maybe we do need the doctrine of equivalents, or 
something like it. 
One thing we might discuss or consider is whether broadening 
reissue is an available option that should be expanded to allow 
people to correct their mistakes.  The current practice for valuable 
applications is to continue filing applications, one after another, to 
keep an application pending in the Patent Office, to in effect do 
 
61 The Federal Circuit has redefined the doctrine of equivalents over the last twenty 
years. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000) (en banc), vacated by 535 U.S. 722 (2002); Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. 
Warner-Jenkinson Co., 64 F.3d 675 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 
F.2d 383, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351 
(Fed. Cir. 1983). 
62 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 577–78 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000). 
63 Harold C. Wegner, Equitable Equivalents: Weighing the Equities to Determine 
Patent Infringement in Biotechnology and Other Emerging Technologies, 18 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH L.J. 1, 6–16 (1992). 
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that, keep correcting the mistakes, broadening the claims so that 
they cover new devices as they come out.64  That, itself, 
ameliorates a lot of the harshness of the doctrine of equivalents. 
So I would ask you to consider whether or not it has outlived 
its usefulness and whether the whole debate over prosecution 
history estoppel is really just a question of whether we should have 
a doctrine at all. 
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Thank you.  That is a very 
provocative ending there. 
The Supreme Court, of course, in Festo, itself went through 
these uncertain issues and came to the conclusion that this is one of 
the prices we have to live with.65 
Hal, do you want to make any comments? 
MR. WEGNER: Yes. 
You know, normally you want a panel where you have people 
fighting, scratching, and clawing against each other.  I totally agree 
with everything that Herb and Mr. Jakes have said. 
There are two ways to look at post-Festo.  One is in litigation, 
which we will probably want to spend most of our time on, but 
also in solutions and how do we deal with things as a practical 
matter. 
Two things were suggested by what Mr. Jakes said.  First, we 
could fix the reissue statute.66  The reason the reissue statute does 
not work is because intervening rights are keyed to the grant date.67  
So when is it that you start to spend a lot of time worrying about 
the scope of your patent?  You file hundreds of patents.  But then, 
when you start to commercialize a product, then you start to spend 
 
64 See Toshiko Takenaka, The Best Approach for Patentees to Prevent Competitors’ 
Trivial Modifications, CENTER FOR ADVANCED STUDY & RES. ON INTELL. PROP. NEWSL. 
[CASRIP] (Univ. Wash. Sch. L.), Winter–Spring 1999,  http://www.law.washington.edu/ 
casrip/newsletter/newsv5i4us3.htm. 
65 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 740 
(2002) (“[T]he doctrine of equivalents and the rule of prosecution history estoppel are 
settled law . . . .  Fundamental alterations in these rules risk destroying the legitimate 
expectations of inventors in their property.”). 
66 See 35 U.S.C. § 252 (2000). 
67 See id. 
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some real moneydo we have an ironclad situation here?  And if 
you do not have the right scope of protection, at this time you are 
the pioneer; there are no intervening rights at that time because 
nobody else is playing in the game.  If intervening rights were 
keyed to the filing date, then there would be no problem.  But the 
way the statute is constructed, intervening rights are keyed to the 
date of the grant of the reissue,68 which could take several years. 
So I would very much like to see intervening rights keyed to 
the filing date of the reissue.  If Finnegan Henderson or Fish & 
Neave prosecutes every case, we would not have to worry about 
the problem too much.  They would have some nice claims.  But 
not everybody can afford to go first class.  We’ve got to think of 
the little inventors who cannot find their way to New York to do 
that.  So once the troops come in and they see that a patent has a 
little technical defect that could be fixed by reissue, we should 
encourage correction.  I think that is a very admirable solution that 
we should seriously consider, just moving the intervening rights 
date to the filing date and not to the grant date, and maybe 
extending the length of time for seeking reissue. 
The other thing is also the Jakes solution, the continuing 
cases.69  I call them Vogel70 trailers.  Did you know that pork is not 
meat?  Did you know that?  I didn’t either, until 1970, when the 
Court of Customs and Patents Appeals (CCPA), the predecessor 
court of the Federal Circuit, said that pork is not meat, or they are 
not the same invention.71  So you take whatever claims you can, 
you file a continuation with a disclaimer, and then you keep that 
new case pending forever and ever and ever, and then you add 
claims when you need them.  Now, that is not a very good public 
policy.  But, it is something that is an effective way to deal with 
the problem.  We do it all the time. 
 
68 See id. 
69 See supra text accompanying note 64. 
70 In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
71 See id. 
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And then, we also encourage secrecy of inventions.72  You 
would like to encourage people to file and publish and let the 
public in on things.  But the ironclad rule in most corporate 
environments, which are concerned about the scope of protection, 
is you file today, you file early and often, and then you keep things 
secret for eighteen months.  That is the magic date when there is a 
publication of the first application.73  But by keeping things secret 
for eighteen months, you file a matrix of cases to flesh out every 
possible, conceivable area in the interval.  That is not good public 
policy either.  It is expensive and it takes a lot of time and effort.  
That is what we, as a pragmatic matter, are doing. 
I have not prospectively relied on the doctrine of equivalents in 
any filing strategy ever.  You do not do that.  When it is fourth and 
twenty-seven, then you are going to try to get relief through 
equivalents.  It’s a last ditch remedy, something one does not 
prospectively rely upon. 
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Herb. 
MR. SCHWARTZ: I do not have much to add. 
The one observation that I would make, which goes I think 
even a little further than Mike’s, is to look back to when the 
Federal Circuit was started, and see what it was trying to 
accomplish.  The first thing that it accomplished was a sea of 
change in the increase in the validity of patents in the patent 
system.74  It really turned day into night or night into day, however 
you want to characterize it, in terms of making patents something 
that were respected and would be sustained, and at the same time 
greatly increasing their value. 
At the same time, and shortly thereafter, I believe that the court 
embarked on a conscious policy, that once you have a valid only 
patent, you should try to get as much certainty as you can into 
determining what its scope was, so that people could understand 
 
72 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2000) (stating that the patent application should be kept 
confidential by the Patent and Trademark Office, and that no information regarding the 
patent application should be given to anyone without the authority of the applicant). 
73 See id. 
74 See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Court Judges Vote in 
Patent Validity Cases, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 745, 754 (2000). 
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what their metes and bounds were.75  I think an awful lot of the 
decisions of the court have really been directed to that aim over the 
last ten years, and I believe that that is where they are still going. 
I think that is what is really driving all of this.  It is driving the 
notion within the court that, in exchange for valid patents, since 
they don’t throw things out for obviousness unless a stiff burden is 
met,76 we are going to make you have claims that people can 
understand and respect.  Big corporations have been pushing this 
because they want to know the metes and bounds of issued patents.  
I agree with Mike that they can afford to get many patents of 
limited scope. 
I think that this drives a lot of this.  I am in sympathy with the 
notion that we should have a limited doctrine of equivalents.  I 
think that the court, given its druthers, falls back upon every 
mechanism they can to convert infringement issues to questions of 
law. 
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Do you see the Federal Circuit’s 
views on written description being tied in with this approach that 
you have just outlined? 
MR. SCHWARTZ: Oh, yes, very much so.  It is the very same 
thing.  The written description enablement77 is the same thing; they 
do not want to allow you to have claims that are any broader than 
what you exactly teach.  It is going to be part and parcel of the 
same notion—yes, we’ll give you valid patents, but you better 
stake it out, you better describe it, you better enable it, and you 
 
75 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (requiring the presence of one or more claims “particularly 
pointing out and distinctively claiming the subject mater which the applicant regards as 
his invention”). 
76 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) (stating that the obviousness or 
nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined by a tripartite test: “the scope and 
content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the 
claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art 
resolved”). 
77 Enablement requires the inventor to disclose the method pursued in creating the 
invention so that “any person skilled in the art or science to which the invention or 
discovery appertains” could duplicate the invention. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.71(a) (2003). 
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better claim it in the way that anyone can understand when they 
read it.78 
MR. WEGNER: Both Herb and Mike have pointed to a very 
important aspect of how the Federal Circuit views patents.  There 
is a large corporate mentality: “We can afford to get blanket 
coverage of many, many, many patents.”  Look at the team that did 
the amicus brief against the patent system in Festo.79  You had 
Ford, IBM, and Kodak.  They are distinguished by filing enormous 
numbers of patents.80  They throw them against the wall and see 
what will stick.  “Here’s my portfolio of thousands of patents, 
literally thousands of patents, now you will take a nonexclusive 
license from me.  If you don’t, I will find a patent and sue you.” 
“Well, it might be invalid.” 
“I do not care.  I’ll find another one.” 
“So here I’ve got a matrix of huge numbers of patents where I 
don’t care which one is valid, I don’t care what the scope of any 
one patent is.  I have so many; it is going to be cheaper for you to 
pay two percent on all your products.  I do not care what the scope 
of my patents are.” 
At the same time, I don’t want to have individual patents that 
are both valid, as Herb was saying, and have an indefinite scope, 
because you might grab me.  You might be a small inventor.  You 
might have your one project and you might have your one or two 
patents.  I do not want to be hamstrung.  I want to be able to design 
around you.  I do not gain anything.  If I never enforce my patents 
for exclusivity, then I do not want to have broad patents. 
Then, on the other side of the coin, you have innovators in 
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, where one patent may be the 
 
78 See id.; Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1477–81 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (finding that claims broader than the original description may be held to be invalid, 
especially where the claim excludes an essential feature and the inventor admits doing so 
after seeing the products of competitors). 
79 Brief of Amicus Curiae International Business Machines Corp. et al., Festo Corp. v. 
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002) (No. 00-1543). 
80 See, e.g., Barnaby J. Feder, Eureka! Labs With Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2001, at 
C1 (illustrating that in 2000, IBM was issued 2,922 U.S. patents and Kodak was issued 
876 patents). 
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be-all and end-all, and then you absolutely want to have this more 
amorphous protection.81 
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Any more comments from the 
panel? 
MR. JAKES: I agree with Hal that not having a doctrine of 
equivalents does favor large corporate interests, most of whom I 
represent.  But I do think that there are those situations where there 
needs to be something to redress the problem where you have a 
small start-up company that has one or two patents and perhaps 
does not really appreciate the scope of what they have.  That is 
why I was suggesting something like broadening reissue, maybe 
throughout the life of the patent.82  I could deal with that. 
I agree with Hal that the intervening rights problem needs a 
solution.  What the well-heeled patent interests do is they keep 
continuations pending and they get around the reissue statute.83  
They continue to file new claims.  That is a practice that I am 
engaged in all the time on behalf of our clients because it is 
available to us. 
Now, I do not want to suggest that the Federal Circuit should 
abolish the doctrine of equivalents.  Even they are probably not 
that bold, having been instructed by the Supreme Court on a couple 
of occasions that they have strayed too far.84  And, to be honest, I 
really think any solution of that type would have to be a legislative 
solution for it to be legitimate. 
These are important questions of public policy and economic 
interests, balancing between certainty on one side and the rights of 
 
81 See Brief of Amicus Curiae International Business Machines Corp. et al., Festo (No. 
00-1543). 
82 See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Chiron Corp., Festo (No. 00-1543).  For a 
discussion of broadening reissue, see Paul Heckel, Possible New Patent Bills, 
International Property Creators, at http://www.ipcreators.org/Issues/posleg.htm (May 15, 
2001). 
83 See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000) (“No reissued patent shall be granted enlarging the scope 
of the claims of the original patent unless applied for within two years from the grant of 
the original patent.”). 
84 See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997); Festo, 
535 U.S. at 722. 
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inventors on the other side.  I think to truly be legitimate, 
something like that would have to be legislated. 
MR. WEGNER: Absolutely.  I agree with you. 
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Hal, would you care to put this in 
an international context? 
MR. WEGNER: Yes.  I think it is an unmitigated disaster.  The 
United States is used as a comparative model throughout the 
world, particularly in patent law.85 
If you take Japan alone, Japan has looked to the United States 
as a model for reform of its own law.86  If you look at Prime 
Minister Koizumi’s own web site,87 there is an intellectual property 
policy outline which has a dramatic blueprint for the salvation of 
the Japanese economy based upon reforms of the Japanese 
system—to focus on intellectual property.88  It borrows from what 
we did twenty years ago with both Bayh-Dole,89 which is not 
relevant here, and more importantly, the Federal Circuit.90 The 
Japanese have restructured their court system to consolidate 
 
85 See, e.g., Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY 
ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994); U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. [U.S. PTO], 
GATT Uruguay Round Patent Law Changes, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ 
com/doc/uruguay/SUMMARY.html (last modified Mar. 1995) (outlining the 
amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 104 “to provide that evidence of inventive activity in the 
territory of a WTO member country be treated the same as inventive activity in the 
United States”). 
86 See, e.g., STRATEGIC COUNCIL ON INTELL. PROP., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY 
OUTLINE  ch. 1.1, at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/titeki/kettei/020703taikou_e. 
html#1-1 (July 3, 2002) (noting that as early as the end of the nineteenth century, Japan 
was observing the US system). 
87 Official Web site of the Prime Minister of Japan, at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/ 
index-e.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2003). 
88 See STRATEGIC COUNCIL ON INTELL. PROP., supra note 86. 
89 The Bayh-Dole Act, enacted in 1980, encourages the transfer of university research 
findings to the commercial markets, thus triggering the development of effective 
patenting and licensing of inventions within universities and colleges nationwide. 35 
U.S.C. §§ 202–212 (2000). 
90 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created in 1982 and it 
assumed the jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the 
appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Claims. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 
1982, 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000). 
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patents in one or two fora and are moving forward to consolidate 
all appeals to the Tokyo High Court.91 
Around the world people look to see what we do.  In the 
Uruguay Round, we were saying we want to have strong patents.92  
In the Geneva harmonization discussions, we were saying the 
United States is a model; we insist upon a strong doctrine of 
equivalents.93  We proposed a draft treaty on the doctrine of 
equivalents in the 1980s which we do not even live up to today.94 
It is terribly disruptive and it makes us look very bad 
internationally when we have these sudden jolts of judicial 
activism, or what Bill Rooklidge calls “judicial hyperactivity.”95  It 
is awful. 
Now, as a practical matter, a lot of the countries around the 
world have seen TRIPS (Trade-Related Intellectual Property 
Rights)96 as a heavy-handed American approach to shove patents 
down people’s throats.97  There is still not an appreciation for 
patents. 
Well, in those countries, how is the judiciary going to interpret 
a patent?  They are never going to have a doctrine of equivalents at 
this point in time.  They do not need to for TRIPS.  And, if 
anything, they are going to do what the Japanese did twenty or 
thirty years ago, providing no equivalents, and going further to 
 
91 See STRATEGIC COUNCIL ON INTELL. PROP., supra note 86. 
92 See U.S. PTO, GATT Uruguay Round Patent Law Changes, at http://www.uspto. 
gov/web/offices/com/doc/uruguay/SUMMARY.html (last modified Mar. 1995). 
93 For a brief discussion on the changes brought to the doctrine of equivalents at the 
Geneva Harmonization talks, see World Intell. Prop. Org. [WIPO], Standing Committee 
on the Law of Patents, at http://www.wipo.org/scp/en/documents/session_4/pdf/scp4_2. 
pdf, at 12 (Sept. 25, 2000). 
94 See Ray D. Weston, Jr., A Comparative Analysis of the Doctrine of Equivalents: Can 
European Approaches Solve an American Dilemma, 39 J.L. & TECH. 35 (1998), 
available at http://www.idea.piercelaw.edu/articles/39/39_1/2.Weston.pdf. 
95 See Rooklidge & Weil, supra note 2, at 729. 
96 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL 
INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994). 
97 See, e.g., Biplab Dasgupta, Patent Bills: Why this Hurry, Features: Legislation, at 
http://www.ganashakti.com/old/1998/981221/featureeco.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2003) 
(stating that the U.S., the WTO, and the World Bank pressured the Indian parliament to 
enact patent legislation). 
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exclude literally infringed embodiments by what is said in the 
specification.  This is almost what we are doing in the Federal 
Circuit in some panels right now.98 
As a practical matter, however, there is a different answer.  
When you have an international portfolio, we have to rely on 
strictly literal coverage.99  That has been the way it has been before 
and it will continue, so it does not really have much of an impact in 
that sense. 
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Having grown up in a literal 
infringement-only environment, because I started off in England in 
my professional career, which never had a doctrine of equivalents 
until the European Patent Convention came along twenty years 
ago,100 it is not such a bad environment to live with.  It is unfair to 
a small inventor in some cases.  That is, I think, the balancing act 
we have to face: where does the certainty—which is normally 
desirable in economic law—end, and the justice that is deserved by 
the small inventor take over? 
The European Patent Convention was amended two years 
ago.101  The draft of the Convention added a specific doctrine of 
equivalents102 instead of the mumbo-jumbo there at the moment, 
and it was going to add prosecution history estoppel103 and say that 
the doctrine of equivalents is determined by whether everything 
has the same function.104 
At the very last minute, just as I think the first Festo decision 
came down, they scrapped two-thirds of that, and in effect said, we 
 
98 See, e.g., Home Diagnostics, Inc. v. Lifescan, Inc., 37 Fed. Appx. 516 (Fed. Cir. 
2002). 
99 See, e.g., Malcolm Royal & Ivan B. Ahlert, International Standard for Claim 
Drafting, WIPO Conference on the International Patent System (Mar. 25–27, 2002) 
(stating that in the draft treaty, the literal wording of the claims shall provide the primary 
basis for their interpretation), http://patentagenda.wipo.int/ meetings/2002/presentations/ 
ahlert.pdf. 
100 Convention on the Grant of European Patents, October 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199. 
101 See Act Revising the Convention on the Grant of European Patents, 2001 O.J. E.P.O. 
SPEC. ED. 3, available at http://www.european-patent-office.org/epo/pubs/oj001/12_01/ 
12_spe1.pdf. 
102 See id. 
103 See id. 
104 See id. 
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are going to have a doctrine of equivalents and we are not going to 
tell you what it is—which is very unhelpful, I think.  That, of 
course, has not yet gone into effect. 
Does anybody in the audience want to add or ask or contribute 
in some way? 
QUESTIONER: Lori Greendorfer.  I am an associate at Salans 
Hertzfeld Heilbronn Christy & Viener.  I am working this weekend 
on an amicus brief on behalf of FICPI [Fédération Internationale 
des Conseils en Propriété Industrielle], and we filed amicus briefs 
in the Supreme Court. 
My question is about the importance of the harmonization of 
the doctrine of equivalents between the United States and other 
countries, where the Federal Circuit’s Festo decision upset any 
hope of harmonization.  Now, with their questions, are they 
suggesting that they are trying to return to a complete bar rule?  At 
least that is how I read the September 20 decision. 
MR. WEGNER: Well, it is interesting.  If you take the Japan 
comparative model, America bashed Japan in the 1980s in the 
harmonization round in Geneva.105  Some people would say that 
Japan now has a doctrine of equivalents. 
There is the famous Tsubakimoto v. THK  caseit is too hard 
to pronounce Tsubakimoto, so we say the Ball Spline case.106  The 
Supreme Court in Japan has a very tortuous test of the doctrine of 
equivalents which narrowly follows the harmonization model that 
we had in the 1980s.107  But the interesting point is the Japanese 
Supreme Court still, today, has never, ever found infringement in 
any case under the doctrine of equivalents.  The Tsubakimoto case 
resulted in a remand and there was no infringement.108 
 
105 See, e.g., MINDY L. KOTLER & GARY W. HAMILTON, A GUIDE TO JAPAN’S PATENT 
SYSTEM (1995) (outlining differences between U.S. and Japanese patent systems), 
http://www.ta.doc.gov/Reports/JapanPatent/pages.pdf. 
106 Tsubakimoto Seiko Co. v. THK K.K., 52 MINSHŪ 113 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 24, 1998) 
(outlining the test for the doctrine of equivalents). 
107 See id. 
108 See id. 
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I was involved in one case where there was infringement in the 
Osaka District Court, Genentech v. Sumitomo,109 where I was an 
expert declarant.  Really now, in hindsight, you could say the relief 
was granted in that case under an equivalents doctrine because of 
pressure through our trade representative. 
Equivalents rulings in Japan are very few in number.  One 
colleague said that there are about ten cases in the lower courts on 
the doctrine of equivalents in the history of Japan.  So there is 
really no equivalents there. 
Germany still is thinking back to the good old days of der 
allgemeine Erfindungsgedanke—which predated the European 
Patent Convention—providing infringement for those taking the 
broad “inventive thoughts.”110  This was abolished by treaty, but 
German courts still seem to find a broader interpretation than the 
British do. 
Being in these harmonization debates in the 1980s, I went to 
Geneva one or two weeks a year for five years, as punishment or 
whatever, and listened in the U.N. to people debating their own 
laws.  Most people who are the legislators and who are the patent 
office officials do not know anything about equivalents; it is 
outside their expertise.  The patent office officials dominate these 
discussions, and they don’t have anything to do with equivalents, 
because they just grant the patents, they do not enforce them.  It is 
sort of like Saturday Night Live to hear everybody talk about their 
own laws.  So that is about where I think harmonization will go 
internationally on equivalents. 
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: I would agree with that. 
Are there any other comments or questions from the audience? 
QUESTIONER: My name is Larry Coury.  I am a patent agent 
at Fish & Neave and also an editor of the Intellectual Property Law 
Journal here. 
 
109 See Genentech Inc. v. Sumitomo Seiyaku K.K., 1586 HANREI JIHO 117 (Osaka High 
Ct. Mar. 29, 1996) (invoking the doctrine of equivalents to find infringement). 
110 See Frithjof E. Müller & Harold C. Wegner, The 1976 German Patent Law, 59 J. 
PAT. OFF. SOC. 89, 121 & n.146 (1977) (discussing this German conception of “the 
general inventive concept”). 
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If you can accept the premise that the Federal Circuit is trying 
to put certainty back into the patent system, I think there is still a 
very high reversal rate of district court decisions by the Federal 
Circuit.  So maybe the certainty is not there, because the district 
courts do not know what to do.  I am wondering—where should 
the court go from here to get to certainty? 
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Mike, do you want to answer? 
MR. JAKES: You make a very good point.  You are probably 
referring to the numbers that are often spoken about, that the 
Federal Circuit reverses district courts close to fifty percent of the 
time on claim interpretation issues.111  Part of that is a function of 
the Federal Circuit’s de novo review, and that whatever the district 
court says is more like a suggestion than anything else. 
I was on a conference call with a district court judge.  I will not 
mention her name, but she is one who happens to hear lots of 
patent cases.  We talked about the trial and other items that we 
were scheduling.  During the course of that conversation, she did 
make a very funny comment.  She said, “You know, I really do not 
decide cases.  I just make the record for the Federal Circuit.” 
There is a high reversal rate, and there is that element of 
uncertainty just in the claim interpretation process as it is.112  Now, 
you layer that with the doctrine of equivalents, and it is virtually 
impossible to give any meaningful advice in certain situations to 
clients who want to know what their business prospects are, 
whether they should design around, and how they can design 
around, when you compound that reversal rate. 
Now, that reversal rate is also somewhat dependent on who the 
particular Federal Circuit judges are.  Some take a more charitable 
view towards the district courts’ opinions and some have appointed 
themselves as the final arbiter on all matters that have to do with 
claim construction.  And I do not think that the goal of certainty 
has been achieved there as well, and I do not know that it will be. 
 
111 Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction 
Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1104 (2001). 
112 Id. at 1080–81. 
4 - PANEL I FORMAT 5/30/03  7:56 AM 
2003] EXAMINING THE FALLOUT FROM FESTO 753 
MR. WEGNER: I have a question for Mike and Herb.  As we 
know from the Vornado case,113 there are odd situations where 
appellate jurisdiction goes to the regional circuit in patent cases.  If 
you had one of those odd situations and you had a very compelling 
equitable case for equivalents, do you think there would be any 
chance that a regional circuit would take the minority view in 
Warner-Jenkinson and say it is a matter for a judge and create a 
conflict?114 
MR. SCHWARTZ: I am not very sanguine that that would 
happen.  I think most of the regional courts are really happy they 
are not in the business anymore. 
MR. JAKES: I think in those rare instances where a regional 
circuit is going to hear a patent case, I think they will follow the 
Federal Circuit down the line because it is the easiest thing to do. 
MR. SCHWARTZ: I would like to go back to Larry Coury’s 
question and echo further what Mike said.  The whole system 
basically is really hung up on claim construction.  I mean, that has 
really turned—at least from a litigation point of view—the practice 
of law inside-out and upside-down, and everything else flows from 
that, because there is really no way to know where you are until the 
claims are interpreted, and the claims do not get interpreted until 
you get to the Federal Circuit.  I mean, it is just as simple as that. 
The judges who try lots of patent cases I think are even more 
concerned about it.  I think I may have in mind the same judge you 
do.  It doesn’t much matter.  We were before her about a month 
ago and she said that the Federal Circuit had reversed it again, had 
reversed the claim construction and everyone was back.  This was 
not our case.  She didn’t understand it, the parties didn’t 
understand it, and they were not sure what to do with it. 
MR. WEGNER: So what should be done? 
MR. SCHWARTZ: What I think, which is sort of heresy, is 
that there needs to be some deference given to the district judges’ 
interpretation. 
 
113 See Holms Group, Inc. v. Vornado, 535 U.S. 826 (2002). 
114 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 14 (1997) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring). 
4 - PANEL I FORMAT 5/30/03  7:56 AM 
754 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13:727 
MR. WEGNER: You mean you should defer to the judge?  My 
goodness! 
MR. SCHWARTZ: Which is what was done in the practice of 
law in this field in my childhood.  You actually paid some 
attention to what the district judge did, and you at least gave them 
some credence for sorting out some sensible interpretations. 
MR. WEGNER: How do we get to that result as a bar, as 
individual litigants or as a bar?  How do we teach Madison Place 
that they should?  I agree with you totally, but how do we get 
there? 
MR. SCHWARTZ: I think by just more pressure from 
practitioners and jawboning judges, not when they’re before them 
but off the bench and in other matters, to try to leave more to the 
courts, because that will lead to more certainty than basically 
deciding anew. 
MR. WEGNER: Right, and it would certainly deter settlement 
if you know that you’ve got a wild-card chance to go up to 
Madison Place and “go fish.” 
MR. SCHWARTZ: Well, it deters settlement.  And, more 
importantly, as Mike said, it deters giving meaningful advice.  
Really, in an awful lot of matters, you cannot give clients any 
meaningful advice.  When I was younger, you could give 
meaningful advice.  The whole purpose of being a lawyer was to 
give advice.  Now you just cannot do that.  That overrides all of the 
equivalence issues, it seems to me. 
MR. JAKES: Absolutely. 
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Do you think that in order to 
achieve this you need specialist patent courts? 
MR. SCHWARTZ: No.  I think that would make it worse. 
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Okay. 
MR. WEGNER: Senator Grassley had proposed a few years 
ago shrinking the number of judges in the Federal Circuit down to 
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seven.115  Another solution is to merge it with the D.C. Circuit.  
That is one solution that has been discussed over the last several 
years—merging the two courts. 
MR. JAKES: I am not sure what the answer is, how to turn 
back the clock, at least with the Federal Circuit, and give more 
deference to the district courts’ decisions. 
In my clerkship for Judge Rich, I have to say that he was not 
particularly deferential to any district court judge, or to the Patent 
Office, or really to anybody else. 
He was entitled to that because he was usually right.  But that 
is not always the case.  My hopeand I don’t know whether the 
bar can have much influence on thismy hope is that the Federal 
Circuit is going to get tired of doing claim construction.  The 
closest analogy I can think of is in my days in law school, when 
my constitutional law professor told me about the cases in the 
1970s dealing with pornography.  The Supreme Court in those 
days felt that they had to decide every case themselves—they had 
to look at the facts, and they had to consider every case as a matter 
of constitutional law.116 
This went on for a number of years, where there were just 
hundreds of cases that they all had to look at.  They had a 
procedure whereby they would do thumbs-up or thumbs-down, 
even without an opinion.  This went on for several years.  Finally, 
they just got tired of it, and then the community standards opinion 
was issued and they got out of the business.117  They just couldn’t 
do it anymore.  So my hope is that maybe the Federal Circuit, after 
ten years of deciding every claim construction issue, will think this 
isn’t such a great thing. 
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Any other questions or comments? 
QUESTIONER: My name is David Perry-Campf.  I am one of 
the editors for the Journal. 
 
115 See SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. OVERSIGHT & THE CTS., 106TH CONG., 
REPORT ON THE APPROPRIATE ALLOCATION OF JUDGESHIPS IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS 
OF APPEALS (1999), http://www.senate.gov/~grassley/graphics/federal.pdf. 
116 See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
117 See California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 127 (1972) (citing Memoirs v. 
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)). 
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I have a question, being a novice in this area.  In Professor 
Richards’ wonderful patents class we discussed Festo last week.  I 
took the Supreme Court’s decision to be struggling with the very 
question this panel is struggling with—whether the doctrine of 
equivalents is worth it and whether the uncertainty is worth it.  
They come to the conclusion, echoing to some degree Judge 
Rader’s dissent from the Federal Circuit, that it is worth it, because 
otherwise you have copyists making insubstantial changes to get 
around the patent if you do not have equivalents, and therefore to 
allow infringement, and the patent holder would have no redress or 
claim against that copyist.  So the Supreme Court decides to keep 
equivalents. 
I am just wondering whether reissue would actually solve that 
problem.  I am thinking about a situation where if I have a patent 
and I am in a world where there is no equivalents and copyist X 
changes something insubstantial; then I have to reissue.  I mean, it 
sounds funny to say that equivalents is efficient, but it seems like a 
much more efficient blanket that covers potential situations.  I am 
just wondering if getting rid of it, as opposed to limiting it, which 
is what I think the Supreme Court intended to do in Festo, is 
actually a good idea.  All the panelists seemed to agree with Mr. 
Jakes when he suggested that.  I am wondering if that is actually 
true. 
MR. JAKES: You raise a good point about the efficiency of it.  
I do not know that it is the solution because of one particular 
problem, and that is the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.  
Reissue sounds good as a philosophical matter.  But in practice, 
getting something through the Patent Office in time for it to be 
meaningful is a problem. 
But I can tell you from my own experience using the 
continuation practice, that you can get very strong literal coverage 
after a number of years, after you have really figured out what the 
invention is worth, where the industry is going, and what your 
competitors are doing.  You do not need the doctrine of equivalents 
if you follow that practice. 
What a reissue allows you to do—or for a patentee who either 
did not have the foresight to file a continuation or did not have the 
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money to keep that going—is give you an option later in the patent 
term.118 
MR. WEGNER: The public gets nailed by the present practice.  
If you think about the dynamics, the examiner is in a game of 
trying to narrow your claims and giving you just narrow claims 
and getting a disposal.  Now, as Mike says, if you have many years 
of Vogel trailers,119 keeping these continuations alive, the examiner 
is in “examiner Disneyland.”  They are getting disposal after 
disposal after disposal. 
And then, all of a sudden, you want this little, very narrow 
claim.  It can’t hurt anybody, can it?  It is one that is fingerprinting 
the accused infringing embodiment. 
I think Mike is right that there is a frustration with going 
through reissue, that in some industries you would like to get a 
patent right away so you could bring a suit, but there are other 
areas where you do not absolutely need to have the patent right 
away.  I am thinking particularly where you have a small company.  
You cannot afford this Vogel trailer practice, cannot afford this 
matrix of patents, and they come up to Fish & Neave or to 
Finnegan & Henderson after they have gone to a mom-and-pop 
patent shop to get their patent allowed, and they are so proud of it.  
They give their beautiful sealed instrument to Mr. Schwartz, and 
he gives it to one of his associates, and they say, “Oh, look, you’ve 
got this little mistake that’s going to narrow it,” and then you have 
to tell them, “You don’t have anything.” 
That is just an unacceptable situation.  If the system does not 
work for the small inventor, it is not going to work for the rest of 
us, and you are going to get all these angry universities and angry 
small inventors railing against every change—irrationally so—but 
they are very upset they have been burned by the system. 
So if the small inventor comes to Fish & Neave or Finnegan & 
Henderson and they are trying to get some capital together to 
 
118 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000) (“No reissued patent shall be granted enlarging the scope of 
the claims of the original patent unless applied for within two years from the grant of the 
original patent.”). 
119 In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438 (C.C.P.A. 1970). See supra text accompanying notes 70–
71 for a discussion of Vogel trailers. 
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develop something, and the invention is still being kept secret and 
there is no competitor, the statutory change would help: Now, if 
you simply do two things to the reissue statute, the inventor can be 
helped—you say that intervening rights are keyed to the filing date 
and you unblock the deadline for filing a broadening reissue.  
Now, Mr. Schwartz and Mr. Jakes can say: “Well, we can save 
you.  There are no intervening rights so far.  We can file a reissue 
and we will get this reissue eventually, and you will be all right.” 
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: If you do that, will you have to 
beef up the circumstances in which you can claim intervening 
rights? 
MR. WEGNER: Oh, yes.  You’ve got to get rid of all this 
garbage.  I’m sorry.  That goes without saying.  You don’t have to 
plead original sin and that you didn’t have adultery in your heart 
and everything else.  You’ve got to get rid of all that stuff.  Yes, of 
course. 
QUESTIONER [Mr. Perry-Campf]: I have a follow-up 
question.  If reissue is the Madame Chang horse, is that really what 
we want to rely on, especially given the PTO’s recent new fee 
structures and things it is issuing, which seem to illuminate 
intention by the PTO to deter future activity with the PTO, or limit 
its amount of work, especially given our interest in protecting 
small inventors who might not be able to afford these new fees? 
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: I think reissue is going to be the 
only way you can afford it with some of these new fees, isn’t it? 
MR. JAKES: I do believe that the fees have some effect, they 
do influence people, but most patents are never used for anything, 
they never go anywhere.  Reissue, even if it were relatively 
expensive, and you are still talking about probably significant 
attorney’s fees to conduct something like that, would probably not 
be enough of a deterrent that it could not be a solution.  But I view 
that as more of a nicety than an absolute bar to the problem. 
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: With reissue you’ve got the 
situation where you are paying the money when you know it is 
something that is really worth spending the money on.  When you 
are filing the patent application, you really just have to hope that 
something is going to happen. 
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MR. JAKES: You know, of course, this whole discussion of 
reissue is Justice Black’s dissent in Graver Tank,120 so it is not like 
it is entirely an original thought.  Other people have expressed this 
as well.121 
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Does anybody else have any 
questions or comments from the floor? 
Can I bring foreseeability into the discussion?  Exactly what do 
we mean by foreseeability?  Professor Adelman has been pushing 
this very hard, particularly at conferences here for the last three or 
four years, as being the test for doctrine of equivalents.122 
MR. JAKES: The Judge Rader test? 
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Yes.  This was the test adopted by 
Judge Rader in Johnson.123 
MR. WEGNER: Go ahead, Herb.  He is your friend. 
MR. SCHWARTZ: I don’t know really how to comment on it.  
Foreseeability in this context, as I said, gives rise to another factual 
issue, which I do not think we ought to have.  That is my problem 
with it.  And it is also ultimately a clash of experts who decide it.  
So it leads to uncertainty rather than certainty, so I think I have 
problems with it. 
MR. WEGNER: Foreseeability came in the 1980s from Heinz 
Bardehle in the Geneva patent discussions as a rallying cry for why 
we need equivalents altogether,124 not that it should be limited to 
 
120 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 614–15 (1950) 
(Black, J., dissenting). 
121 See, e.g., Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in 
Patent Law: Questions that Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 719 
(1989) (“The use of the doctrine of equivalents to upset [the reissue procedure] cannot be 
justified.”); Matthew J. Conigliaro et al., Foreseeability in Patent Law, 16 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1045, 1055 n.25 (2001). 
122 See Martin Adelman, Is the Use of the Doctrine of Equivalents to Fix Mistakes a 
Mistake?, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 1021, 1023 (2000) (“It is my opinion that covering after-
arising equivalents should be the central function of a judicially administered doctrine of 
equivalents.”). 
123 Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1056–60 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (Rader, J., concurring). 
124 See Bardehle, Pagenberg, Dost, Alenburg & Giessler, Heinz Bardehle, Bardehle: 
Publications, at http://www.bardehle.com/en/publications.html#bardehle (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2003). 
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foreseeability.  Heinz Bardehle, who was the general patent 
counsel at Siemens many years ago and has been a leading private 
patent practitioner for the last generation or so, gave the 
example—what happens if you turn the clock back before the 
transistor when you had radio tubes.  At that time, what happened 
if you had a new improvement in an invention that had nothing to 
do with the tubes, but you had a claim to a combination of vacuum 
tubes plus X, Y, or Z, and now what happens when the transistor is 
invented?  If you do not have equivalents, you cannot foresee this, 
then all the patents to new innovations that were tied in a 
combination claim to a vacuum tube would be obsolete. 
That is where a lot of this came from in the 1980s, and this 
spread through the literature.  But it was never an idea that Heinz 
or I had that this should be the only area where equivalents should 
apply. 
I go back.  Mike mentioned what I was doing ten years ago, 
wasting time writing on things that nobody was reading.125 
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: I was reading it. 
MR. WEGNER: Well, you wrote on it, too.126 
I go back.  If you want to talk a little history of great jurists, in 
this generation we think of his judge, Judge Rich, who was truly a 
great person.  But in the context of history there are two people 
who would compete very heavily as great patent jurists.  He 
mentioned Learned Hand. 
The other one is Joseph Story.  Joseph Story, if you look at his 
portrait in the Supreme Court, you will see a plaque explaining 
what he has done.  It goes on forever and ever.  It does not even 
mention patent law.  He was appointed to the Supreme Court in 
1813 and had a remarkably long career, until 1845.127  He was the 
Dane Professor of Law at Harvard University.  In the old days, 
each Justice rode circuit.  They spent very little of their time in 
Washington.  He was picked to be the Circuit Justice for Boston 
 
125 See, e.g., Wegner, supra note 63, at 7–8. 
126 See John Richards, International Aspects of Patent Protection for Biotechnology, 4 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 433 (1993). 
127 R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE 
OLD REPUBLIC (1985). 
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and he had all these trials in Boston.  This is where the doctrine of 
equivalents was born. 
So it is dismissed.  Some of Story’s work, like in the case of 
experimental use, is dismissed as just being some case law maybe 
of some odd, obscure judge.  This was Joseph Story, who really 
created the patent law, more so than any one person in this country. 
He had an advantage over Judge Rich and Learned Hand.  
There was pretty much a blank slate on which to write.  But he 
created the doctrine of equivalents in 1814 and it was an equitable 
doctrine.128 
I would love to see us go back to Story’s philosophy.  He said 
that you should not permit a colorable variation.129  If you look at 
the contemporaneous meaning of colorable, it connotes 
deviousness, it means cheating, it means stealing.130  You should 
not be able to permit somebody to just carve around the niches of a 
claim, where it is obvious that the inventor had sought more 
protection.  As Mike said, in those days, they didn’t even have 
claims. 
MR. JAKES: I would like to make a couple of comments on 
foreseeability. 
There are several open questions that I think are likely to be 
addressed.  For example, one that comes to mind is the timeframe 
at which foreseeability will be determined.  As I recall from the 
Supreme Court’s opinion, it mentioned both time of the 
amendment and time of the application.131  That is an ambiguity in 
the Court’s opinion as to when that foreseeability determination 
will be made. 
More likely, I think that the foreseeability determination is 
going to break down into a discussion of after-developed 
 
128 See Odiorne v. Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 10,432). 
129 Id. (charging the jury to consider “whether the machines used by the defendant are 
substantially, in their principles and mode of operation, like the plaintiff’s machines”). 
130 See III OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 503 (2d ed. 1989) (defining colorable as 
“[c]overt, pretended, feigned, counterfeit, collusory, done for appearance’ sake” and 
providing contextual references contemporary to Justice Story demonstrating such a 
denotation). 
131 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739–40 
(2002). 
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technology.  If something was currently available at the time of the 
application, then my guess is that it may be deemed foreseeable 
and something that was developed later will not. 
We faced some of this debate already in a case that I argued 
this May, which was decided fairly recently, which involved a 
claim that was directed to two pieces of an assembly for a cable 
filter.132  “A front cap and a rear insert” was the way it was 
claimed.133  The accused infringer in the case uses a single piece.  
After the decision came out, there was some debate with the 
Federal Circuit, with my opponent submitting authority saying that 
the foreseeability test should be applied.134  So I suspect that in 
front of the district court we are going to see that argument as to 
whether a one-piece assembly was actually foreseeable. 
But, as Herb says, this will complicate the litigation by creating 
a potentially new factual issue.  And how do you prove it?  What 
type of evidence do you allow?  Is it a person skilled in the art?  Is 
it a reasonable patent attorney who should have known that he 
should have drafted claims of a certain breadth? 
I do not know that we will see Festo hearings, like Markman 
hearings, but I would not have told you ten years ago that we 
would have Markman hearings. 
Thank you. 
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Yes? 
QUESTIONER: My name is Dave Torrente.  I am a patent 
agent for a suburban firm and also a student here at the Law 
School. 
Mr. Wegner, you just mentioned about the copyist carving 
around a niche of the claim.  If it seems like the general feeling of 
the panel is that if we can find a way to get rid of the doctrine of 
equivalents, that would not be all bad. 
 
132 Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v. Arrow Communications Labs., Inc. 305 F.3d 1303 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002). 
133 Id. at 1307–08. 
134 Submissions by Arrow led to a substituted opinion. Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v. Arrow 
Communications Labs., Inc., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 
123 S. Ct. 995 (2003).  The case was remanded to the district court. 
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Is it absolutely necessary that the prosecution history be public 
record?  It seems to me that that is one tool that a copyist will 
frequently use is to go to the prosecution history and see where the 
applicant tried to get broader claims but was forced to narrow to 
get it past the examiner. 
MR. WEGNER: That is a very good question. 
First, I want to make it clear that I would favor a doctrine of 
equivalents.  I am explaining that some industries do not like 
equivalents. 
But with respect to prosecution history estoppel, one of the 
most refreshing new scholars on the scene is Professor John R. 
Thomas, who just recently went to Georgetown University Law 
Center.  He has something over almost everyone else in the 
academic and practice world.  He is a comparative scholar.  He has 
been at the Max Planck Institute for a year, and then at Chizaiken 
in Tokyo for a considerable period of time.  So, he looks at things 
from a comparative standpoint. 
He had a debate with Don Dunner a year ago at the Giles 
Sutherland Rich American Inn of Court, where he said, let’s burn 
the file wrappers.  That is a radical thought, but it is something to 
consider.  Even though I have lived abroad, too, and done some 
comparative scholarship, this shocked me.  I am not saying I am 
ready to go that far, to burn the file wrappers. 
But Canada’s Supreme Court recently said they’ve looked at 
our prosecution history estoppel and they repudiate it.135 
Sir Robin Jacob, a bit ago, wrote an opinion where he had to 
interpret American law—he had to interpret Festo.136  Can you 
imagine anyone so careless to draft a license agreement (a) to be 
interpreted under British law by British courts, and (b) where the 
grant clause is tied to the scope of an American patent?  That is 
 
135 Free World Trust v. Electro Santé, Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1024 (finding that the 
greater the level of discretion left to the courts to look beyond the claim language in a 
search for the spirit of the invention, the less the claims perform their public notice 
function and the greater the resulting level of uncertainty and unpredictability). 
136 Celltech Chiroscience Ltd v. MedImmune Inc., [2002] E.W.H.C. 2167 (Ch. Patents 
Ct.) (Eng. & Wales), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Patents/2002/ 
2167.html. 
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exactly what Sir Robin faced.  He did a very nice job analyzing 
Festo and artfully shows the weakness of the American law.  He, 
in essence, says as to the application of such law to the United 
Kingdom, that they’re not going to touch that over in their 
country.137 
It is an interesting concept.  We will never unilaterally in the 
foreseeable future eliminate prosecution history estoppel.  My own 
feeling is if someone says to the examiner that something is 
disclaimed, something is not covered, that he should be stuck with 
that.  To me, prosecution history estoppel has been an invaluable 
tool.  The classic prosecution history estoppel has been an 
invaluable tool to predict with certainty a pathway to design 
around inventions, and I would be horrified to lose that tool. 
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: I think if we don’t, we go back to 
the claiming “nose of wax”138 of 120 years ago, so there is an issue 
there. 
The Supreme Court of Canada regarded the prosecution history 
estoppel as a can of worms, I think they said, in the Electro Santé 
case.139  Is that right? 
Anybody else have anything? 
MR. JAKES: I am not sure I would know how to practice 
without being able to look at the file history.  But I guess I am 
open to new suggestions as well, and I did hear Professor Jay 
Thomas’s speech on that. 
Just to make myself clear, I am not necessarily advocating 
abolishing the doctrine of equivalents.  I think it deserves some 
 
137 See id. 
138 See White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47 (1886).  This case presents the famous “nose of 
wax” analogy, where the Supreme Court stated that: 
Some persons seem to suppose that a claim in a patent is like a nose of wax, 
which may be turned and twisted in any direction, by merely referring to the 
specification, so as to make it include something more than, or something 
different from, what its words express. . . .  The claim is a statutory 
requirement, prescribed for the very purpose of making the patentee define 
precisely what his invention is; and it is unjust to the public, as well as an 
evasion of the law, to construe it in a manner different from the plain import of 
its terms. 
Id. at 51–52. 
139 Free World Trust v. Electro Santé, [2002] 2 S.C.R. at 1024. 
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thought, though, because of the problems with it.  I think there is a 
problem that the doctrine of equivalents addresses, but I have 
watched the Federal Circuit struggle for twenty years trying to 
make it workable.140  It is probably the best we have, at least at the 
moment, and so I think we should think about alternatives if it 
truly is unworkable. 
Looking at the file history, though, I just do not think that is 
going to change, at least in the near future, at least for claim 
interpretation purposes, because there is valuable information in 
the file history if your goal is certainty, to look at it.  I do not have 
any problems with competitors picking apart the file history and 
using it as a way to determine how they should structure their 
actions, because, if anything, I think more information is helpful in 
that circumstance. 
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Would you draw any distinction 
between prosecution history estoppel and using the file history for 
interpretation of the claims? 
MR. JAKES: Certainly the Federal Circuit draws a distinction.  
Sometimes I fail to see the difference. 
MR. SCHWARTZ: I was going to go back to your comment 
about the doctrine of equivalents.  I, too, do not want to abolish it.  
The problem I have is the way it has been interpreted and used. 
I think one other thing that has driven the Federal Circuit is the 
jury system in this country, which, as we all know, is unique in the 
patent world with the initial strengthening of patents and the use of 
the doctrine of equivalents by juries.  At least in jury trials 
probably in the early 1980s, the doctrine of equivalents was the 
vehicle to right any wrong, basically.141  That is really where a lot 
of this stems from. 
 
140 See Jay I. Alexander, Cabining the Doctrine of Equivalents in Festo: A Historical 
Perspective on the Relationship Between the Doctrines of Equivalents and Prosecution 
History Estoppel, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 553 (2002). 
141 See, e.g., Molinaro v. Hart Elecs. Corp. of Scranton, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 735, 747–
50 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (finding that the exact scope of protection given by means of the 
doctrine of equivalents tends to vary depending upon the circumstances), aff’d, 646 F.2d 
983 (3d Cir. 1982).  However, in the mid-1990s, the doctrine was under attack as 
granting too much power to the patentee.  An inventor with a challenged patent had a 
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I think no person who is knowledgeable in the field would 
think that the doctrine of equivalents is just out there to rewrite the 
patent by any jury that wants to and then just leave it, in effect, 
immune from attack on appeal on the reviewing standard of clear 
and convincing error. 
That is what has really driven all of this, the jury system in 
combination with essentially otherwise-valid patents.  The Federal 
Circuit has just really been cutting back on that, poking at it here, 
there, and everywhere, and it has just made a crazy-quilt pattern 
that is almost impossible to deal with. 
MR. WEGNER: Yes.  And that is exactly why I want an equity 
solution, because I completely agree with what Herb says, that it is 
the jury that is driving us all crazy by determining what the 
equivalents are.  So that is why I wanted to have equivalents 
determined as a matter of equity, where the judges could in very 
rare, limited circumstances apply the doctrine.  It would be much 
as in the case of Potter Stuart and pornography, to know it when 
one sees it.142  Only in some very clear equitable situation would 
you apply the doctrine of equivalents.  It should be a very, very 
narrow application.  But you leave it to a jury, and then you get the 
mess we’re in today. 
I was on a panel in Melbourne a year ago.  A British barrister 
said, “You Americans, you are always getting so involved with 
mens rea.”  When you get into equivalents with a jury you are 
always going to favor the patent owner against the big, bad 
infringer, thinking about enablement and what is going on in the 
mind of the infringer. 
We are uniquely crazy in our mens rea fascination.  I would 
love to have reformthat is why I want equity.  I mean, Herb is 
absolutely right on the jury thing. 
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: What would you put into the 
analysis? 
MR. SCHWARTZ: Potter Stewart.143 
 
difficult task in trying to ascertain just what a court might not find to be an equivalent. 
See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
142 See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
143 See id. 
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PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Just when you see it? 
MR. SCHWARTZ: Right now it is a question of fact for the 
jury.  Without all of the engrafting that the Federal Circuit has 
done, in theory the jury could do almost anything.  When you think 
about it, the jury really, in most of the other areas, has something 
to compare it against, if they are dealing with anticipation, if they 
are smart enough to understand that.  Even in obviousness, there is 
something to understand.  On equivalents, it is the first and last 
time in their life that they ever see it.  The arguments are purely 
equitable, and the so-called legal tests are something that even 
scholars do not understand.  How a jury is supposed to understand 
what is right or wrong in the one time in their life they see it is 
really very difficult, and I think driven by the equity above and 
beyond what the patent system allows. 
MR. WEGNER: You really have to go through a trial with a 
jury to see this stuff.  I had a failed marriage counselor as my jury 
consultant about six years ago to prepare me as an expert witness.  
He was explaining how ninety-four percent of the effectiveness of 
the witness is how you look and feel and act.  He is now known as 
Dr. Phil, after he prepped Oprah Winfrey.  He was admitting that 
he was a failed marriage counselor.  He played a major role in the 
trial.  But, that is not how justice should be done.  It should not 
become a talk show. 
MR. JAKES: I think of a concurring opinion that Judge Plager 
wrote.144  He often has a cynical view of the doctrine of 
equivalents, or you can draw that from his opinions.  In that 
particular case, the court was remanding back for a factual 
determination on equivalency.  Judge Plager in his opinion said, 
“May the best lawyer win.”145 
MR. WEGNER: Yes. 
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Hal, would you have a go at trying 
to wrap up what you think we have accomplished this morning? 
MR. WEGNER: Well, we can each take a turn at that. 
 
144 See Caterpillar Inc. v. Deere & Co., 224 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Plager, J., 
concurring). 
145 Id. 
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I think the bottom line on Festo from a practical standpoint is 
that it really does not change too much in the way top-of-the-line 
law firms and lawyers have practiced in terms of procurement.  We 
have never prospectively ever, ever, ever relied upon the doctrine 
of equivalents. 
What we need to do as practitioners is to have the humility to 
understand that we cannot always write the most perfect 
application, and we should take the benefit of hindsight to criticize 
our own work.  As long as we keep an invention secret during the 
eighteen-month time window after filing, every time we pick up an 
application, for whatever reasonto respond to an office action, to 
do an information disclosure statement, discuss it with a 
clientwe should look at the claims from the standpoint of the 
pirate, the third party who might want to chisel around our 
invention: Where are the weak points in my application?  Where 
does my client not cover something that could be covered? 
And when we find some mistake that we have made, a mistake 
in hindsight, we file another case and another case.  We file as 
many cases as we can in this eighteen-month period and get a 
matrix of protection and go forward with that. 
And we follow what Mike Jakes said at the tail end of the 
procurement road.  When we pay our issue fee, we file a Vogel 
trailer.  In re Vogel146remember, this is the case that taught us 
that pork is not meat.  (Isn’t that odd?  Did you know that pork 
isn’t meat?  I am still fascinated by that case.) 
So that is what I see for procurement.  I will leave it to Herb to 
talk about what he thinks about the litigation consequences. 
MR. SCHWARTZ: I would actually like to go back to 
something which I didn’t mention earlier, but which I was 
reflecting on in listening to all of this. 
I had the unusual pleasure of being the Special Master who 
tried Festo in the initial instance.147  It was referred to me by Judge 
 
146 In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438 (C.C.P.A. 1970). See also supra text accompanying notes 
70–71 for a discussion of Vogel trailers. 
147 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., No. 88-CV-1814, 1994 WL 
1743984 (D. Mass. Feb. 3, 1994), aff’d, 72 F.3d 857 (Fed. Cir. 1995), vacated by 520 
U.S. 1111 (1997). 
4 - PANEL I FORMAT 5/30/03  7:56 AM 
2003] EXAMINING THE FALLOUT FROM FESTO 769 
Mazzone in Boston.  I was given Judge Harrington’s courtroom 
and tried it for three weeks.  My decision is referred to in the 
reported decision when you see it.148  When it was before me, it 
was something that I figured would be gone in two weeks or a 
year.  That shows you how little I knew about it. 
I formed definite views on the equivalents issues as a matter of 
fact, just in my own mind, as to what was fair and what was 
reasonable.  I concluded, at that time, that one of the patents was 
barred on file wrapper estoppel and the second one was not,149 
which is a split that nobody else has come up with since, basically.  
I actually had a view that, reading the file history, a reasonable 
person would assume that the patent owner had given away the 
magnetic limitation on the Stoll patent, and therefore it wasn’t fair 
for him to recapture it.150  Whereas, the other limitation of two 
versus one was trivial and was really plainly a design-around of the 
claims that had no meaning of substance.151 
Now, that is a type of result you could get by looking at it 
simply on the equity, which is what I did at the time and which you 
could do under the law then.  This was eleven years ago, 
amazingly enough. 
But if you look through the opinions now, the tests that are 
going to come up probably would not allow that result at all.  The 
way they are interpreting foreseeability and the other doctrines, 
they are going to either throw it all in or throw it all out.  To me, it 
gets rid of what I would think the initial purpose of that doctrine 
was: to do equity in the rare case. 
MR. WEGNER: In the rare case. 
MR. SCHWARTZ: Yes, which is where I am with Hal. 
And so I think that the sum of it is that the doctrine has lost or 
is losing its way in terms of what it really should accomplish, 
especially in this particular case. 
 
148 See id. at *1–*6. 
149 See id. at *2. 
150 See id. at *4. 
151 See id. at *6. 
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MR. JAKES: I, too, would like to see the doctrine returned to 
its equitable roots and be a question for the judge. 
One thing I would like to mention in closing is that, for all the 
attention that we have focused on Festo, the Supreme Court’s 
opinion leaves intact a large body of Federal Circuit law on the 
doctrine of equivalents.  It is relatively untouched.  Following the 
cases, as I have and many others have over the years, the Federal 
Circuit has taken an increasingly restrictive view of the doctrine of 
equivalents, regardless of what it did in Festo, Festo being just one 
manifestation, I think, of its efforts in that area.152 
So the Supreme Court has left most of that law intact and 
embraced it in the Warner-Jenkinson case.153  So we do have today 
a fairly narrow doctrine of equivalents, which I believe is its 
appropriate role. 
I would also prefer to see it addressed by a judge rather than a 
jury, because I think we would get better results in that 
circumstance.  But if we are going to have a doctrine—and we do 
need something to address those situations where the application is 
not perfect—then having it very narrowly circumscribed I think is 
the best thing. 
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Thank you all. 
 
 
152 See Alexander, supra note 140. 
153 See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
